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Ill the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

CAROLINE P. JENSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
GEORGIAN CORPORATION, INCORPORATED, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

CASE
NO. 8708

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE

This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon a verdict of the jury in favor of Georgi,an Corporation, Incorporated, defendant and respondent, and against Caroline
P. Jensen, plaintiff and appeUant, in the Fourth Judicial
District Court of Utah County. For convenience we will
refer to the parties as plaintiff and defendant in this brief.
We deem the issues drawn by the pleadings of the parties
in this case of such importance as to warrant a brief analysis at the outset.
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In her Complain.t, as amended, the plaintiff alleges that
she received serious permanent injuries as a result of tripping over a steel sewer plug which protruded above the
surface of the concrete floor in the basement lanndry provided for her as an apartment house tenant of the defendant. Plaintiff further alleges that the negligence of the
defendant consisted in its allowing "a steel plug . . . to
protrude and project upwards from the surface of the floor
several inches, and so located as to create a dangerous and
unsafe condition for plaintiff's laundry work . . ." (R.
4-5). These allegations the defendant denied (R. 7). Plaintiff further alleges that the dangerous and unsafe condition existed for more than two years prior to the plaintiff's
injury, during which time "defendant had knowledge and
had been warned thereof" by tenants "that same was exposing said tenants to injury;" but that defendant "with
reckless disregard for plaintiff's safety, failed, neglected
and refused to remove said steel plug from said floor," thus
proximately causing plaintiff's injury (R. 11). This also
was denied by the defendant (R. 13). In its Amended
Answer, defendant pleaded affirmatively plaintiff's contributory negligence and assumption of risk (R. 7 and 9).
The issues arising from these allegations of negligence
by plaintiff and from their denial by defendant are as follows:
1. Was it negligence for the defendant to allow the
sewer plug to protrude above the surface of the concrete
floor in the laundry area provided for plaintiff in which to
do her laundry work?
2. Did the plu~'s protrud~ng above the surface of the
basement floor create a dangerous rondition?
3. Did the defendant have knowledge of this danger-
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ous condition for more than two years prior to the time of
plaintiff's injury?
4. Was defendant warned of the dangerous condition and of the fact that its tenants were being exposed to
injury?
5. Did the defendant fail and refuse to heed these
warnings and remedy the dangerous condition before the
plaintiff received her permanent injuries?
At the trial the plaintiff adduced evidence in support
of tha foregoing allegations of her Complaint. Plaintiff
sought at the trial to have her theory of the defendant's
liability presented to the jury in her Requests for Instructions Nos. 3, 5, 8, 11, and 12 (R. 77, 79, 81, 85, and 86),
which requests the court refused to give, and to which refusals the plaintiff excepted.
Over plaintiff's objections as to its materiality, the
court admitted in evidence a portion of the Provo City
Plumbing Code, and also expert testimony that defendant
had complied with that· code in the installation of the sewer
plug in the basement in question. The court gave the jury
Instruction No. 15, which quoted the said Provo City
Plumbing Code without any comment whatsoever, taking
same from defendant's Requested Instruction No. 12 (R.
29 and 66) , to which instruction pl,aintiff excepted. The
court admitted, over the objection of the plaintiff on the
ground that it was immaterial and improper opinion evidence, testimony of expert witnesses that the sewer plug
was properly located in accordance with the said sanitary
code, although the said expert witnesses also testified that
the installation and location of the plug had nothing to do
with safety. All of the foregoing matters were called to
the attention of the court in plaintiff's Motion for New
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Trial, which motion was du1y argued, and denied by the

court (R. 94, 95, 96 and 100). From the judgment entered
upon the verdict and from the court's Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial this appeal is taken.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In support of her Complaint as amended, plaintiff
proved the following facts at the trial:
Plaintiff is an elderly woman of the age of 67 years,
has a family of four children, all of full legal age, and has
been a tenant in Apartment No. 43 in defendant's Georgian Apartments in Provo, Utah, since 1952 (Tr. 179-180).
During that period she kept house in that apartment for
herself and two members of her family Jessie Jensen and
Bobby Jensen. She rented the apartment from one Carl
B. Clegg, defendant's manager, and the laundry area in the
basement of the south wing of the apartments was assigned
to her for her use in doing her laundry in common with
other tenants of defendant's apartments (Tr. 181-183).
Each week during her tenancy, plaintiff, with the help of
her children Jessie and Bobby, did her laundry work in this
basement laundry area (Tr. 182). The general layout of
this basement laundry is shown by the plat, Exhibit P-1
(R. 90). The area is a little over 60 feet from east wall
to west wall, and a little more than 20 feet from north wall
to south wall. The walls and floor are of concrete, and
the partitions form three rooms. Laundry sinks are located in the east room and the west room, and there is a
washer located near the sink in each of the two rooms.
The middle room is used exclusively for drying clothes.
Along the walls of the rooms, principally along the north
wall, lockers ·are provided for the use of the tenants. In
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each of the three rooms lines for hanging clothes have been
provided. A stairway leads into this area from the east
end, and this was the entrance regularly used by plaintiff
to enter and leave the area. Plaintiff did her washing in
the east room but had always bad access to the facilities
in all three of the rooms each week when she did her laundry (Tr. 182-184).
In the floor of the west room, about four and one-half
feet south of the front of the north locker and about five
and one-half feet west of the east locker, a metal sewer
plug was located which served as a clean-out for the sewer
line which ran beneath the surface of the floor. The base
of the sewer plug is about four inches in diameter and is
level with the floor, but the plug had a metal wrench shoulder about one and one-fourth inches square, projecting
and protruding upwards to about one inch above the surface of the concrete floor, as shown by Exhibits P-2 and
2A (R. 90). This sewer plug thus protruding above the
surface of the floor lay directly in the path which tenants,
entering the west room from the drying room, were obliged
to move along in order to hang clothes on the west lines
in the southwest corner of the west room (Tr. 93-94). The
metal shoulder of the sewer plug, located as it was, and
protruding above the smooth surface of the floor, created
a hazardous and dangerous situation for defendant's tenants using the laundry area almost from the beginning of
its occupancy. The witness, Clegg, manager or defendant's apartments from 1951 to 1954, and his assistant, both
tripped over the plug in the early part of this period. Clegg,
while on a tour of inspection in this very laundry area with
"Nick," one of defendant's principal officers and its President (Tr. 234), pointed the sewer plug out to him and said,
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"This is something that ought to be taken care of or somebody's going to fall and hurt themselves." Also, Clegg
thereafter on "quite a few inspections" pointed out the
serwer plug to "Nick" and told him it should be taken care
of (Tr. 172 and 173). Defendant's tenants Backman and
Tanner, as well as one J.ex and Wiserniller, doing work in
the laundry area, were either seen to trip over the sewer
plug or advised Clegg that they had so tripped (Tr. 163170). In the spring of 1953, Vera Backman, one of defendant's tenants, tripped over the sewer plug and so advised Clegg, the defendant's manageT (Tr. 73-74). But
nothing was ever done by the defendant about removing
the plug, up to the time Clegg left in February of 1954 (Tr.
173). The witness Planty was a tenant in the defendant's
apartments from 1951 until 1955, and did her laundry work
in this same area. She frequently observed both manager
Clegg and manager Price, after Clegg left, in the west room
of the laundry in the vicinity of the sewer plug in question (Tr. 23-24). She testified that she tripped over the
plug herself and saw others trip over it (Tr. 24-25), and
that defendant's then assistant manager, Price, saw her
do so on one occasion, which was in about the year 1953.
She believed that the sewer plug was dangerous and advised manager Clegg of her tripping (Tr. 26). The witness Miller, another tenant of defendant's apartments from
August 1954, to August, 1955, testified that on occasion
she saw defendant's manager down in the laundry area in
the west room, and that she herself had tripped over the
plug several times during that year (Tr. 39, 41, 42), and
that nothing had been done to remove it (Tr. 46). The
witness Bobby Jensen tripped over this sewer plug about
three months before plaintiff, his mother, was injured on
1
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it (Tr. 50, 51, and 52). He advised defendant's manager,
Price, "that plug ought to be changed; somebody's going
to trip and hurt themselves," burt nothing was done to remedy the situation. About a year and a half before her
mother was injured, the witness Jessie Jensen tripped over
this sewer plug while coming from the lines in the west
room where she had hung up clothes. She so advi·sed defendant's manager, Price, telling him, "You ought to have
that plug fixed," but no change in the plug was thereafter
made (Tr. 94-95).
Plaintiff had tripped over this same sewer plug "quite
a while before" her serious injury on April 6, 1956, and had
advised defendant's manager, Price, of it; but northing was
ever done to remedy the condition of the protruding plug
(Tr. 189-190). The witness Price, defendant's manager,
recalled that Bobby Jensen advised him about two weeks
after Clegg left, which was in the spring of 1954, that the
sewer plug should be changed, "that he thought it was dangerous," and that he, Price, had agreed with him about the
danger (Tr. 215-216). From these facts the conclusion is
warranted that the protruding sewer plug in the laundry
area provided by defendant for the use of plaintiff and its
other tenants was a dangerous hazard from the time the
apartment house was opened for tenants in 1951; that the
defendant's managers and principal officer knew full well
of same; and that nothing was done a:bout the plug until
after plaintiff had sustained her serious and permanent injuries on April 6, 1956, when the defendant caused the said
plug to be removed and a new sewer plug, level with the
surface of the surrounding concrete floor, to be installed
(Tr. 216).
On the evening of April 6, 1956, while plaintiff was us-
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ing the west room of the laundry area, which she had done
all during her tenancy (Tr. 182) without objection of defendant's managers, (Tr. 229) she tripped and fell over
the protruding plug (Tr. 184-185). Because of an old arthritic fusion condition of a vertebrae of her spine (Tr. 144145) plaintiff was proceding carefully at the time she
tripped over the plug (Tr. 187-188). In the fall plaintiff
broke her right hip bone and suffered other injuries (Tr.
190-191). Dr. Kezerian diagnosed the injury as an "intracapsular fracture of the right hip" (Tr. 128), performed
a surgery called "replacement prosthesis" (Tr. 134) in
which a metal socket called "vitalliwn" replaces the hip
socket bone (Tr. 136), and characterized the damage as
permanent, stating that, "she will always limp" (Tr. 138).
The doctor gives his prognisis and describes plaintiff's condition as of April 9, 1957, stating at the end thereof that,
"I believe it is permanent" (Tr. 139, 140, and 141).
The sewer plug was allowed to remain protruding above
the surface of the west basement room floor by defendant's managers and officers until a few days after plaintiff had suffered her serious and permanent injuries, when
defendant's m'anager, Price, changed it and put an inverted
type of sewer plug in its place (Tr. 216 and 230).
By the testimony of two witnesses, Woods (Tr. 254282) and Hodson (Tr. 285-294), the defendant sought to
defend on the grounds that the sewer plug in question was
installed in the Georgian Apartments in accordance with
the Provo City Plumbing Code. Over plaintiff's objection on grounds of materiality, the court allowed Woods
to testify concerning the plumbing code requirements (Tr.
261). A portion of the plumbing code of Provo was received in evidence over the objection by the plaintiff that
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it was immaterial and irrelevant 1Jo the issues (Tr. 262).
A further objection by plaintiff to the questions put to
Woods about the proper location of the sewer plug relative to the requirements of the plumbing code on the
grounds that it was immaterial was overruled by the court
(Tr. 263-2,65). Woods admitted that his testimony pertained to the location of the pipelines and sewer plug under
the sanitary plumbing code (Tr. 271-272). On cross-examination when Woods was asked if there was anything
in this code requiring that the plug be put in with a metal
shoulder protruding above the surface of the floor, the
court sustained defendant's objection thereto that it was
not proper cross-examination (Tr. 273-274). Woods further testified that the location of the plug had been determined solely by considerations of sanitation, that safety
had no bearing on that installation, and that the code does
not require the protrusion of the metal shoulder above the
stuface of the traveled portion of the floor (Tr. 279-280).
Over plaintiff's objection that it was immaterial, Hodson
was permitted to testify as to the location of the plug with
regard to the code (Tr. 289). However, Hodson also testified that the code was for sanitary purposes only; that
it does not require the plug to protrude above the surface
of the floor; and that he never co!l1Sidered the safety factor at all in connection with his testimony (Tr. 294).
Upon these facts as they appear in the record, it is plaintiff's position that the court committed prejudici-al error
(1) in admitting the testimony offered by defendant that
the sewer plug was properly located on the basement floor,
and in further admitting in evidence a portion of the Provo
City Sanitary Plumbing Code, because the Code bad no
relevance to the issue of safety raised by the pleadings,
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and applied only to sanitary considerations; (2) by giving
Instruction No. 15, which contained only the portion of the
said Provo City Sanitary Plumbing Code admitted in evidence and quoted ve~batim in said instruction, without any
comment by the court as to its possible application to the
facts of the case or any comment whatsoever; and (3) by
refusing to give plaintiff's Requested Instructions numbered 3, 5, 8, 11, and 12, which embodied her theory of defendant's liability under the issues raised by the pleadings
and the evidence.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY ADMITTING DEFENDANT'S EXPERT TESTIMONY THAT THE SEWER PLUG IN QUESTION WAS INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF
THE PROVO CITY SANITARY CODE UNRELATED
TO SAFETY; ALSO BY ADMITTING TilE SAID CODE
PROVISIONS IN EVIDENCE; AND BY GIVING THE
JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER 15, SE'ITING OUT
SAME WITHOUT COMMENT.

POINT II
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 3, 5, 8, 11, AND 12, THUS
DENYING PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO HAVE HER
THEORY OF DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY UNDER THE
FACTS OF THliS CASE PRESENTED TO THE JURY.
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THE ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY ADMITTING DEFENDANT'S EXPERT TESTIMONY THAT THE SEWER PLUG IN QUESTION WAS INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF
THE PROVO CITY SANITARY CODE UNRELATED
TO SAFETY; ALSO BY ADMITTING THE SAID CODE
PROVISIONS IN EVIDENCE; AND BY GIVING THE
JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER 15, SETTING OUT
SAME WITHOUT COMMENT.
Plaintiff made no claim in her pleadings, or at the trial,
that the negligence of the defendant consisted in the violation of an ordinance or statute. Nor in its pleadings did
the defendant seek to defend on the theory that it had
complied with an ordinance or statute. At the trial, however, defendant did offer evidence which was intended to
show that it was free from negligence because the sewer
plug in question had been located in accordance with a sanitary code plumbing ordinance of Provo City. The said
plumbing code was ,and is wholly unrelated to the inte,re,st
of plaintiff which was violated, or to any claim thalt she
made about the negligence of defendant. Plaintiff's claim
is that defendant allowed the metal wrench shoulder in
question to protrude above the surface of the basement
floor over which the plaintiff, and the other tenants, had
to pass in order to do their laundry work, and that tills
condition was -dangerous and a hazard to their safety, all
of which was well known to the defendant for a period of
years, and that no remedial action was taken by it. De-
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spite the fact that the plaintiff's claim was overwhelmingly
supported by her evidence, as well as that of the defendant, the court, over her objection on grounds of immateriality and that it was outside the issues raised by the pleadings, allowed defendant to give evidence that the sewer plug
in question was placed on the basement floor in accordance
with a sanitary plwn:bing code provision, and admitted the
code in evidence. Furthermore, the court subsequently
gave Instruction No. 15, setting out the sanitary code provision in question without any comment whatsoever about
its possible connection with plaintiff's charge of negligence
against defendant. It is plaintiff's position that the court
in so doing committed error which was misleading to the
jury and highly prejudicial to the plaintiff.
The said Provo City Plumbing Code provisions as
quoted from the court's Instruction No. 15, are as follows:
"You axe instructed that the Plumbing Code of
Provo City, Utah, provides:
'Cleanouts shall not be less in size than the pipe
served, up to four (4) inch pipe. Cleanouts for screw
pipe and fittings shall be heavy cast brass plugs with
a solid wrench shoulder, not less than one (1) inch
thick and one (1) inch high . . .
'Cleanouts shall be installed in the building drainage system at all right angle or ninety (90) degree
changes in direction and at the end of all horizontal
lines of soil, waste and drain pipes . . . and provided further, that, the location and number of cleanouts required in each installation of soil, waste and
vent pipes shall,be subject to rthe approval of the plumbing inspector.' ''
Defendant's witnesses, Woods and Hlodson, both ad-
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mitted on cross-examination that the quoted code did not
require that the metal wrench shoulder of said sewer plug
protrude above the surface of the well-traveled basement
floor, and in fact both witnesses admitted that the location
of the plug had been determined solely by considerations
of sanitaJtion, and that their testimony did not at all go to
the safety factor in allowing the sewer plug to so exist.
Obviously, the plumbing c<Xle provisions go only to the protection of interests involved in sanitation ·and health; on
the other hand, ·that interest of plaintiff which was violated
was unrelated to the code on the pleadings and the record,
the interest violated being that of physical security from
violent injury, and not her interest to be free from disease
caused 'by WlSanitary conditions.
On what theory the court admitted the Provo City
Plumbing Code and evidence pertinent thereto is not disclosed by the record. Certainly the defendant made no
claim that the plaintiff's claimed contributory negligence
was her violation of the provisions of the said plumbing
code. Nor did the plaintiff claim that defendant had vi~
lated the same. Had there been such claim, the applicable
principle of law in such cases is stated as follows in 38
American Jurisprudence, Section 158, at Page 827 and following:

"Comprehensively stalted, the rule is that where
a statute or municipal ordinance imposes upon any
person a specific duty for the protection or benefit of
others, if he neglects to perfonn that duty, he is liable
to those for whose protection or benefit it was imposed for any injuries of the character which the statute or ordinance was designed to prevent, and which
were proximately produced by such neglect, provided,
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according to the rule prevailing in some, but not all,
jurisdictions, the plaintiff is free from contributocy
negligence."
And see to the same effect: Prosser on Torts, Section
39, Page 264; Restatement of the Law, Torts, Volume! 2,
Section 286, Page 752; and Utah Law Review, Volume 3,
Page 397. See also Mechler vs. McMahon, 239 N. W. 605,
where it was said by the court at Page 607:
"We now state the rule to be that, in the absence
of valid excuse or justification, the vloiation by the
injured person of a statute or ordinance enacted for
the benefit of the other party is conclusive evidence
of contributory negligence, if such violation proximately contributes to the injury. The rule in this state
has always been that the unjustified violation by the
defendant of a statute or ordinance enacted for the
benefit of the injured party is negligence per se, if it
proximately results in injury.
"If the statute or ordinance was not enacted for
the benefit of the party invoking it, the general rule
is that irt is wholly immaterial, although the acts which
constituted violation may be admissible on the question of common law negligence. In other words, the
general rule is that the violation of such statute or
ordinance is not even a circumstance to be considered
on the question of negligence or contributory negligence. Whether such statute or ordinance was enacted for the benefit of a particular person is a question of law."

The defendant seems to imply that the rule a:bove
stated applied to it conversely, i.e., that because the sewer
plug in question had been installed and located in its basement laundry area floor, defendant was thereby cleared of
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any negligence whatsoever. Plaintiff maintains, however,
that the principle could not be applied conversely thus for
the reason that the ordinance in question was not enacted
for the benefit of the defendant who invoked it, nor to
protect that interest of the plaintiff which was violated,
and that same was not designed to prevent the injuries
she received as a result of the unsafe condition of the protruding sewer plug. In fact, the said plumbing code provisiqns can have no relevance to the claim of negligence
with which plaintiff charged the defendant: namely, that
the sewer plug being allowed to protrude above the surface of the floor was a ha2lard to her safety.
Defendant seems to justify the admission of the plumbing code provisions and evidence pertaining thereto, by
contending that the doctrine of "what the law specifically
authorizes cannot be wrongful." Here again the defendant's implication is--even though the plaintiff made no
claim that the plumbing code provisions had been violated
by defendant-that the location and installation of the
sewer plug in accordance with that ordinance having as
its purpose sanitary matters, such as the preservation of
health, relieved defendant of any responsibility on its part
to keep the area provided for plaintiff as an incident of hertenancy free from safety hazards. Most courts apply this
doctrine very narrowly and against the contention of defendant .
The case of McGettigan vs. New York C. R. Co., 268
N. Y. 66, 196 N. E. 745, 99 A.L.R. 283 (1935) involved an
action for damages sustained by plaintiff when the vehicle
in which she was riding struck the concrete base of a signal placed by the defendant in the center of a highway adjacent to its railroad tracks. Plaintiff recovered in the
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lower court, and on appeal the defendant urged a reversal
of the judgment on the ground that the object struck had
been authorized and installed by law, and that therefore
there could be no civil responsibility for damages in the
action. The legal requirement pursuant to which the signal was placed came from an order o the Public Service
Commission for its installation. It was undisputed that
defendant was required to comply with such an order. The
principle point relied upon by the defendant was that it
owed no duty to the plaintiff beyond that defined by the
order of the Public Service Commission. The Appellate
Court ooncluded that the matter was properly submitted
to the jury, and at page 286 of A.L.R. report the following
was said:
"The problem, it may be observed again, is to settle
by construction the limits of the orders of the Public
Service Commission. The doctrine that what the law
specifically sanctions cannot itself be wrongful has
been narrowly applied in this court. 'We need not
discuss the cases, or consider how broadly the doctrine
should be permitted to operate, since one condition or
limitation has been firmly grafted upon it, which raises
the final and ultimate question in the case before us.
That limitation is that the authority which will thus
shelter an actual nuisance must be express, or a clear
and unquestionaJble implication from powers conferred,
should be certain and unambiguous and such as to
show that the legislature must have contemplated
the doing of the very act in question.' Hill vs. Mayor,
etc., of City of New York, 139 N. Y. 495, 501, 502, 34
N. E. 1090, 1092. See 1 Street on the Foundation of
Legal Liability, pp. 41-45.
"Authority to defendant to place the signal apparatus in the center of the highway was conferred in
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general terms of mere permission. There was no imperative command that the structure if so located was
to be maintained with the specific equipment and northing more. Indeed, there is no negative word in either
order of the Public Service Commission. Defendant
is not here held liable merely because it made an unwise choice between the alternatives afforded by the
orders. As we read .them, a larger discretion was
thereby left to defendant, and the presumption is that
this discretion was intended to be exercised in conformity with private rights. (citing cases)
We can find no room for the implication that defendant was to be immune although (as the jury could
have found) it kept a dangerous thing in the highway
after knowledge of the danger."
The evidence in the case at bar elearly esta!blishes the
protruding wrench shoulder to be a nuisance. There is no
express or implied authority in the Plumbing Code invoked
by defendant which will sanction the existence of such a
nuisance. The annotation in 99 A.L.R. 287, cites cases
which support plaintiff's contention that aside from the
mandate of law as embodied in an ordinance, a person is
still required to exercise such rights in conformity with
private rights and, therefore, is nort excused from the responsibility that the law of negligence places upon him.
In the present case, there is no reason in logic or jus-

tice which would jusrtify admitting in evidence either the
Provo City Sanitary Plumbing Code, or the testimony of
defendant that the construction of the sewer and drains
and the clean-out plug in question was performed in accordance with that code, since the same was not intended
to have any application to the safety of tenants using the
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said area for laundry purposes as an incident of their tenancy.
It is plaintiff's position that the court's Instruction
No. 15, setting forth the bare provisions of said sanitary
plumbing code, with neither comment nor explanation as
to its possible application to the evidence in the case, was
misleading to the jury and highly prejudicial to plaintiff.
This instruction was taken verbatim from defendant's Request No. 12 as amended, but the court struck therefrom
the following comment about the code quoted:
"If you find by the preponderance of the evidence
in this case that the clean-out plug of which the plaintiff complains was installed in compliance with this
provision of the Provo City Plumbing Code then you
may not find that defendant was guilty of any negligence in the installation, use, or maintenance thereof, and in that event your verdict should be for the
defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of action." (R. 66).

Apparently the court regarded the comment stricken
as improper, but made no comment whatsoever as to what
application the quoted code might have to the evidence
in this case. This left the jury free to speculate on the immaterial evidence admitted over plaintiff's objection and
to conclude that defendant was not guilty of negligence because the se,wer plug in question was installed as required
by the quoted code, which in any case clearly had nothing
to do with safety, but was enacted for sanitary purposes
alone.
Common experience with jurors leads us rt:o the conclusion that to quote a law in an instruction without comment or explanation as to its relevance to the facts in evi-
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dence to be considered by the jury leaves its members free
to speculate about its possible meaning, and is misleading
and highly prejudicial to the party against whom it is invoked.
Meado;rs vs. Huffman, 127 P2d 806 (1942), was a case
in which the plaintiff had been injured by falling into an
uncovered opening in a street in the City of Oklahoma
City. Plaintiff offered an ordinance of that city pertaining to unguarded openings adjacent to a street, sidewalk
or alley, claiming that defendant had violated same and
was guilty of negligence per se. The ordinance was received in evidence and the court instructed the jury that
its violation constituted negligence per se, and plaintiff
recovered. On appeal the question oncerned rthe materiality of the ordinance in question and whether the court's
instruction thereon was error. The court held that "the
ordinance, . . . is inapplicable, and was not admissible in evidence for any purpose" on the ground that it
did not apply to the area in question and that the court's
instruction thereon was prejudicial error. On the question of the prejudicial effect of admitting such an ordinance
and instructing thereon, the court had the fjollowing to say
at page 808 of Pacific Reporter:
"Considering these things together the instruction,
if not tantamount to directing a verdict for the plaintiff, was at least strongly suggestive and persuasive of
such action by the jury. If the minds of the jury were
influenced by the ordinance and the instruction and
believed that the defendant was negligent as a matter
of law, they could not at the same time have given
proper consideration to the defense of the defendant
including that of contributory negligence."
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The judgment of the lower court was reversed, largely
upon the court's opinion a:bout the extremely prejudicial
effect of admitting in evidence and instructing the jury
upon the ordinance in question, and the strongly persuasive
effect that the bare citation of such enactments of law
have upon juries.
POINT II
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 3, 5, 8, 11, AND 12, THUS
DENYING PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO HAVE HER
THEORY OF DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY UNDER THE
FACTS OF TH.[S CASE PRESENTED TO THE JURY.
Defendant's denial of plaintiff's allegations in her Complaint, as amended, that the sewer plug in question, which
protruded and projected upwards from the surface of the
floor, was so located as to create a dangerous and unsafe
condition which existed for more than two years prior to
plaintiff's injury, during which time defendant had been
warned that the same was exposing ~the tenants to injury,
but that defendant "with reckless disregard for plaintiff's
safety, failed, neglected and refused to remove said steel
plug from said floor," clearly created the principle issue
upon which the parties went to trial. The evidence adduced by plaintiff overwhelmingly supports her claim, as
indicated by the proven facts on the record. There can
be no question but that the defendant landlord could not,
charged as it was by this array of uncontradicted evidence
about the dange~rous condition created by this protruding
sewer plug, defeat plaintiff's action to recover for her seri-
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ous and permanent injuries by the plea of contributory negligence and assumption of risk . The cases so holding are
collected in a recent annotation in 25 A.L.R. 2d 364, et seq.
A New Jersey case is there cited which seems to reflect
the situation obtaining in the case at bar. At page 403 of
the annotation it is stated as follows:
"Since there was evidence that the defendant landlord had actual notice that nails were projecting from
the steps of a common stairway in his tenement house
long before the plaintiff, a tenant, was injured when
her skirt caught on the protruding nails, causing her
to fall, it was held in Kramer vs. Lehrhoff (1923) 99
N.J.L. 47, 122 A 540, that the plaintiff could not be
charged wirth assumption of risk or contributory negligence in using the stairs, the court saying that the
landlord was not entitled to assume a laissez faire attitude, relying in perfect security upon the contributory risk his tenants necessarily incurred in the use
of the leased premises, and that the tenant was not
obliged, rather than use the stairs and assume the risk,
to confine herself to her apartment 'in comforting meditation upon the benignant solicitude of the landlord.' "
To the same effect see: Burt vs. Baker (1937) 22 Cal
App. 2d 501, 71 P2d 335; Farrell vs. Weisman, (1932) 108
N.J.L. 458, 158 A. 826; Palmer vs. Dearing (1883) 93 N.
Y. 7; Finch vs. Willmott (1930) 107 Cal App 662, 290 P
660; Lebovies vs. Howie, 307 Mkh. 306, 11 N. W. 2d 906,
908; Cunningham vs. Silverstein (Pa.) 40 Lack. Jur. 42, 46;
Mundy vs. Stiles (Tex. Civ. App.) 257 S. W. 2d 750; and
see also 25 A.L.R. 2d 444, at page 447, where it is said:
"The same circumstances relied upon to charge
the landlord with constructive notice of the defective
condition will also ordinarily tend to establish notice
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on the part of the plaintiff, and so reflect upon the issues of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
However, while it is generally held that such notice
is a relevant circumstance in determining whether the
mode of use by the plaintiff showed a proper consideration for his own safety, the courts have usually held
that the mere fact of continued use will not be enough
to establish, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk."
No complaint is made by plaintiff that the court instructed the jury in Instructions Nos. 4, 10, 17, 20, 24, 26,
and 28, embodying defendant's theory of the case , largely
in relation to its pleas of contributory negligence and assumption of risk on the part of plaintiff. But plaintiff does
complain that it was prejudicial error for the court to refuse to instruct the jury in her Requested Instructions numbered 3, 5, 8, 11, and 12, embodying her theory of the defendant' s liability on the pleadings and facts adduced in
support thereof at the trial.
Briefly summarized, plaintiff's requested instructions
which the court refused to give were as follows:
Request No. 3 asks the court to instruct that defendant corporation could act only through its officers and employees, that the defendant's apartments were being opel\
ated by its managers with whose acts it would be charged,
that Clegg and Price were such managers from the fall of
1951 to the time of plaintiff's injury, and had been given
notice of the hazard of the protruding floor plug while they
were acting within the scope of their authority. This instruction was clearly proper on the evidence, since both
Clegg and Price admitted that they were defendant's managers during the period mentioned, and that notice of the
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hazardous condition of the floor plug had been given to
them by tenants, including plaintiff.
Request No. 5 goes to the question of plaintiff's choice
of going into the dangerous situation in the laundry area,
about which she had knowledge, in order to accomplish
the purpose for which defendant had provided her with the
laundry area. It has to do with the question of whether
or not plaintiff assumed an unreasonable risk in going into
the laundry area to do her laundry when, despite the dangerous situation existing there, and its being well known to
defendant, no other place was supplied her in which to do
her laundry.
Request No.8 gives the jury the facts, which are overwhelmingly supported by the evidence, aJbout the existence
of the protruding sewer plug in the laundry area, about
plaintiff being obliged to pass same when doing her laundry work, about defendant failing to supply plaintiff 'allY
other place to do her laundry work, about her continuing
to do such work in the area knowing of the existence of
the protruding sewer plug, thus exposing herself to the risk
of bodily harm, and that she was not guilty of contributory
negligence, unless her going into the area to do her laundry was assuming an unreasonable risk.
Request No. 11 asks the court to instruct the jury as
to the meaning of "reckless disregard for the safety of another." We believe that the instruction is proper upon the
pleadings, the evidence and the law in this case. It states
that the defendant knew through its managers, and indeed
through its President and one of its principal owneTs, during the period of 1952 to 1956, when plaintiff was injured,
that the condition created by the sewer plug was hazardous, that tenants were tripping frequently during all of
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said period, and that defendant failed to do anything about
it until after plaintiff was rendered a cripple for life by
tripping and falling over it. Under these facts, it is for the
jury to say whether or not the conduct of the defendant
in thus failing to prevent injury to its tenant was in reckless disregard of the safety of another.
Request No. 12 presents the facts which are overwhelmingly supported by the evidence on these issues raised by
the pleadings and, as does these other instructions the court
refused to give, embodies plaintiff's theory of defendant's
liability under the law and the facts in this case.
We call attention to the fact, which is alleged in the
Complaint and admitted by defendant's Answer, that the
plaintiff, at the time of her injury, was doing her washing
in the laundry area of defendant's apartment house, where
she had a right to be because defendant provided same for
such use. Plaintiff had a clear right to exercise the privilege afforded her by defendant to do her washing in the
laundry area, which was the only place provided for her
to exercise that right. In this situation the plaintiff was
subjected to danger by the defendant's negligently allowing
the plug to remain in the floor where she had to pass while
doing her washing. In such a situation the Restatement
of Law, Tor1s, Volume 2, Section 473, at page 1243, states
the rule of law applicable as follows:
"If the defendant's negligence has made the plaintiff's exercise of a right or privilege impossible unless
he knowingly exposes himself to a risk of bodily harm,
the plaintiff is not guilty of contributory negligence in
so doing unless the risk is unreasonable."

It is submitted that the plaintiff, who had a right tD
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be where she was to do her laundry work, cannot be de-

prived of her right to recover the damages she sustained
on the defendant's plea of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, principally because the risk she took and
had taken for some years prior to the occurrence of this
serious accident, was not an unreasonable ooe.
Furthermore, plaintiff claimed in her Amended Complaint, and the claim is preponderatingly supported by the
evidence, that defendant knowingly allowed this dangerous condition of the sewer plug to exist for such a long
period of time that the action in so doing constituted reckless disregard for the rights of the plaintiff. The law supporting plaintiff's position in this regard is stated in the
Restatement of the Law, Torts, Volume 2, Section 482, at
page 1261-2, as follows:
"(1) Ex:cept as stated in sub-division (2), a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery
for harm caused by the defendant's reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety.
"(2).A plaintiff is barred from recovery for harm
caused by the defendant's reckless disregard foc the
plaintiff's safety if, knowing the defendant's reckless
misconduct and the danger involved to him therein, the
plaintiff recklessly exposes himself thereto."
The ·comment following this rule refers to a definition of reckless misconduct as defined in Section 500, which
follows at page 1293:
"The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of
the safety of another if he illltentionally does ·an act
or fails to do an act whioh it is his duty to the orther
to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which
would lead a reasonable man to realize that the ac-
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tor's conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk
of bodily harm to the other but also involves a high
degree of probability that substantial harm will result
to him."
Again, we call attention to the fact that the defendant knew of the dangerous situation created in the laundry area by the plug, and had been repeatedly warned that
someone would be hurt unless it was remedied. Despi~
this fact, the defendant failed 'and neglected to do anything
about the danger, until the serious accident which has
made the plaintiff an invalid for life occurred. We submit
that under these facts, and under the law above referred
to, the defendant was guilty, not only of negligence, but
of a reckless disregard for the safety of its tenants, including plaintiff, who had a right to use the laundry area. In
any event the law accords the plaintiff the right to have
this, her theory of defendant's liability, submitted to the
jury. Under such circumstances, our position is that defendant cannot hide behind the rule of contributory negligence and assumption of risk and oblige the plaintiff "to
confine herself to her apartment 'in comforting meditation
upon the benignant solicitude of the landlord,'" as was
said by the court in the New Jersey case (supra).
The above mentioned requested instructions embodied
the plaintiff's theory of defendant's liability under the facts
and the law obove mentioned. The refusal of the court
to grant plaintiff's said requests was made one of the principal grounds of her Motion for New Trial (R. 94-95, 1, d,
e, f, and g), but the court refused to grant the motion.
It was held by this court in Beckstrom vs. Williams, 3 Utah
2d 210, 282 P2d 309, that the plaintiff has a right to have

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27
his theory of the case submitted to the jury if the evidence
would justify reasonable men in following the theory, the
court saying at page 212 of the Utah Report:
"The jury having rejected plaintiff's complaint, on
appeal we would ordinarily view the evidence in the
ligh most favorable to the defendant. This is nort
true, however, in this case where plaintiff's appeal
challenges the trial court's refusal to submit plaintiff's
theory of the case to the jury, as was his undoubted
right if the evidence would justify reasonable men in
following his theory.''
The court cited Morgan vs. Bingham Stage Line Company, 75 Utah 87, 283 P. 160. In that case the defendant
challenged the trial court's ruling refusing to give requested instructions which presented defendant's theory of the
case on the evidence. The Supreme Court held that this
refusal to grant the requested instructions and to give defendant's theory of the case to the jury was prejudicial
error upcm which a new trial should be granted, and in so
doing the court had the following to say:
"A party is entitled to have his case submitted to
the jury on the theory of his evidence as well as upon
the theory of the whole evidence. Toone vs. O'Neill
Const. Co., 40 Utah 265, 121 Pacific 10; Hartley vs. Salt
Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 Pacific 522, 523, and Miller vs. Utah Consolidated M. Co., et al, 53 Utah 366,
178 Pacific 771; Pratt vs. Utah Light and Traction Co.,
57 Utah 7, 169 Pacific 868."
"'~he following language of Mr. Justice Straup in
the case of Hartley vs. Salt Lake City, supra, is peculiarly applicable here: 'There are two parties to a
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law suit. Each, on a submission of the case to the
jury, is entitled to a submission of it on his theory and
the law in respect thereof. The defendant's theory
as to the cause of the accident is embodied in the proposed request. There is some evidence, as we have
shown, to render them applicable to the case. That is
not disputed. We think the oourt's refusal to charge
substantially as requested was error. That the ruling
was prejudicial and works a reversal of the judgment
is self evident and unavoida!ble,"
In view of the pleadings and the evidence on the record, reasonable men would be amply justified in following
the plaintiff's theory of the case. It is the plaintiff's contention that the court committed prejudicial error in refusing to submit same to the jury.
CONCLUSION

We sincerely believe that because the court (1) admitted in evidence the immaterial Plumbing Code, the expert testimony concerning same, and set out the bare code
provisions without comment in Instruction No. 15, and (2)
refused to submit plaintiff's theory of the case to the jury
under the law and the great weight of the evidence, that
prejudicial error was committed. We submit that plaintiff, who has been rendered a cripple for the rest of her
life as a result of the extremely negligent conduct of defendant, will suffer a grave injustice unless this Court orders a new trial in this case. We earnestly urge, upon the
grounds that the above mentioned errors of law committed by the court at the trial are prejudicial to the rights
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of plaintiff, that the judgment on the verdict should be reversed and a new trial granted her.
Respectfully submited,
BALLIF & BALLIF
GEORGE S. BALLIF
GEORGE E. BALLIF

Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
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